@COP17: “BASIC is not a negotiation group.” Yes, you are!

The Brazilian top negotiator, Ambassador Corrêa do Lago, said something very interesting yesterday during Brazil’s daily press briefing:  

"BASIC is not a negotiation group."

(BASIC is the acronym for Brazil, South Africa, China and India; often referred to as ‘emerging powers’ or ‘major economies’ in new UNFCCC lingo.)

I think BASIC is a negotiation group, and many others – including the reporter who posed a question about a BASIC position – would probably agree with me. Interestingly, even China appeared to contradict the Brazilian negotiator’s statement when it made formal interventions on behalf of BASIC earlier this week here at COP 17.

So let’s take a closer look at the meaning of Ambassador Corrêa do Lago’s statement and their implications for the ongoing climate talks.

A Bit of BASIC Background

When the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, the political situation and economic size of Brazil, South Africa, India and China placed them firmly in the group of developing countries. Since then they have made some dramatic gains (in democratic terms in Brazil and South Africa, and in economic terms in India and China); collectively they are now producing more the 20% of global GDP, and China has surpassed the US as the single largest global emitter of CO₂ (check out Hochstetler and Viola, 2011).

The BASIC group was formed in 2009 at COP 15 in Copenhagen, when the now ‘emerging powers’ were facing increasing pressure by both developed and developing countries to start taking on serious mitigation responsibilities (Hallding et al., 2011 provide a lot of detail for the story of the emergence of BASIC). BASIC presented a surprisingly well-coordinated position at COP 15, successfully fighting off demands for numerical and legally binding emission reduction targets. The resulting Copenhagen Agreement was a back-room deal between the fours BASIC members and the US, in which they committed to voluntary mitigation action. What an interesting meeting of the minds in this Coalition of the Unwilling! I guess only Canada was missing in the room.

Since Copenhagen BASIC ministers have been meeting regularly, issuing peppered statements outlining their climate change position. These statements (the latest from November is most fun) tend to emphasize the political balance enshrined in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol: only Annex I countries are responsible for emission reductions; further the developed world provides technology transfer, funding, and capacity building support to the developing world (including BASIC) to enable their mitigation and adaptation efforts. This is commonly knows as the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR).

BASIC @ COP 17 – Who am I?

Based on this history, it seemed obvious that BASIC would present itself as a negotiation group (like the Umbrella Group, AOSIS or the LDCs) with a coordinated position at COP 17. So far, that has not been the case. At least officially, they seem to put a lot of effort into NOT appearing as a negotiation group (apart from China’s blip on Monday).

·      Each of four countries have been speaking on behalf of the G 77 & China, forcefully endorsing the position of the G77 & China, or casually referring to their membership in that group.

·      Unlike other negotiation groups, BASIC does not seem to have an office here at the ICC (at least I have not found it yet).

·      BASIC has not been giving any press briefings; Brazil and South Africa do so every day in their national capacity.

·      Even when asked directly about issues that require a political response from the emerging powers (e.g., the EU proposal of a road map towards a new legally binding agreement in 2015), they point to the G77 & China position.

So apparently, the BASIC group is trying very hard to keep a low profile. But I suspect once the going gets rough next week, they’ll find an office (hopefully not in the frequently flooded parking garage) and have a coordinated position. Wanna bet they already meet?

So why are the BASICs pretending to be invisible? The answer can best be illustrated with the CBDR principle.

The way the BASIC members want to be seen is as a part of the developing world, with a shared history, identity and well-understood position as ‘the weak and victimized’ in the international system. This identity emphasizes the burden and injustice of (carbon) colonialism, and the responsibility of the Global North to address the historically unjust distribution of wealth and wellbeing in the world by providing various forms of support to the Global South. In the climate context this translates into the concept of historical responsibility, which allows BASIC to demand that the developed countries (without doubt the main emitters over the course of the 20^th century) ‘fix what they broke’ by reducing carbon emissions and by providing the poorer countries the financial, technological and other resources to adapt and mitigate. It also allows them to make a moral claim that the rich owe the poor.

However, this group membership and identity has become increasingly hard to justify for the BASIC countries – both to the Global North and to those developing countries, who are still impoverished and/or extremely vulnerable to climate change impacts.

Recognizing the increasing disconnect between BASIC diplomacy and BASIC reality, the EU has gathered up the courage to openly address this politically sensitive issue here in Durban with the argument that CBDR is a dynamic principle that is not “frozen in time,” but needs to take into account “current and changing socio-economic realities and development opportunities”.  While they are not naming specific countries, they are clearly pointing the finger at the BASIC members, implying that they are ‘developed enough’ to take on responsibility for mitigation, and suggesting that their moral high ground has been eroding due to by their quickly growing economies and contribution to climate change.

The BASICS are clearly uncomfortable with the idea that they might have to leave the cozy nest of the G77 and “grow up” to become something else. While they seem very keen to get this special status in other contexts, where more power means benefits rather than costs, they are understandably reluctant to do the same in the climate regime. Like every teenager, they probably feel that power and independence are great, but this responsibility thing sucks. However, with the developing countries pushing, and the developed countries pulling, I don’t think they can hide behind the G77 much longer.

The evolution to a world with BASIC as a naturally self-confident negotiation group could unlock many of the issues that are holding the climate negotiations hostage. Instead of a fight between two sides (developed vs. developing countries), we would suddenly deal with three different actor groups, and might even recognize that there is a whole range of differences between international actors that might justify differentiated rights and responsibilities under the UNFCCC. Suddenly there are new ways to share the mitigation burden, to engage South-South solidarity and to focus on the advantages of a low-carbon future for all. Principles like CBDR, that have helped stalling negotiations for years, would finally be up for renegotiation, creating space for a more productive discussion about the road ahead.

BASICs, stand up to who you are!