@COP17: Is there a Deal in the Cards?

The corridors are getting crowded, the language in the working groups is getting tougher, almost all sessions are closed to observers by now, and the pressure to put agreeable words on paper is rising at COP 17. With the arrival of ministers and heads of state (unfortunately none from the major emitters) for the ‘High-Level Segment” that will start tomorrow (130 formal speeches back-to-back – YAY!) the tension is tangibly growing.

What will their delegations be able to hand them when they get off the plane, and will those documents and options be sufficient to create a meaningful Durban Deal?

Here are what I think will be the big issues this week here in Durban (but as others have noted: “This is the most difficult UNFCCC Conference of the Parties to get a read on in recent memory.”) Let’s start with the hottest of all potatoes:

1.         The Kyoto Protocol (KP)

While most parties seem to agree that a second commitment period (2CP) is desirable, it remains unclear who is willing to participate in that beyond the 27 EU member states, and how long the 2CP should last. AOSIS pushes for five years in order to avoid locking in “low mitigation ambition”; the EU has put eight years on the table because their current legislation is valid until 2020 (not a convincing reason, if you ask me). The emerging compromise is a “mid-term review” of the Kyoto targets, to which all KP members could contribute (including those who do not sign up for 2CP). 

However, the EU has made it clear that for them a 2CP is conditional upon everyone agreeing to a roadmap towards a new, legally binding agreement to be negotiated between now and 2015 with emission reduction obligations for all major economies (see Durban Mandate, below). China has vaguely indicated that it might be willing to accept a legally binding agreement, one could doubt the motivation of such a hint (as Todd Stern has done today). The Chinese negotiator keeps emphasizing the need to strengthen the existing legal instruments rather than creating a new one. The US has not said anything constructive on this issue and other major economies have yet to take a position on the EU’s proposal. My guess is that Brazil and South Africa are inclined to say yes; India will remain a tough nut to crack.

Also, keep in mind that the Americans never joined the KP (and cannot credibly do so now), and that Japan, Russia and Canada have stated strongly that they will not support a 2CP.  So let’s see who can hold their breath longer.

2.         The Ambition Gap

One much-debated question last week was how to raise the level of ambition regarding emission reduction targets. A recent UNEP report has concluded that current, voluntary post-Copenhagen pledges will not be able to keep warming below 2°C (we are headed towards 3.5°C). This has raised alarm bells, esp. among highly vulnerable countries (and it’s good to see that at least some players really keep an eye on the science and care about real-world climatic changes). But some big players seem to shrug this off, e.g., with comments about the “numerous pathways to 2°C” (John Pershing, US negotiator). 

Those who are concerned about the heating planet see at least two ways to become more ambitious: (i) by significantly increasing the emission reduction targets for Annex I countries in a 2CP of the KP, and (ii) by ramping up – and making legally binding – the presently voluntary targets of everyone outside the KP (called nationally appropriate mitigation actions – NAMAs – since Copenhagen).

·     KP: The present KP target (5% below 1990 levels by 2012) has not helped to slow climate change. The new target for 2CP might be anywhere between 20 and 40% below 1990 levels by 2020. Given the major uncertainties regarding the Whether, Who and How of a 2CP, this will likely be a fairly random compromise number bargained over hard in the late hours of Friday night.

·     Non-KP: While the Americans seem to think that the Copenhagen Agreement will carry us to 2020, and additional pledges cannot and should not be expected of anybody at this point in time, nearly everyone else (including some major economies) argue that more is needed, and it’s needed now. This is where the spotlight is fixed on the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). They in turn point out that developed countries that are not part of Annex I of the KP should take on comparable mitigation commitments. More generally, since Copenhagen’s voluntary approach has fallen short in light of the political goal to stay below 2°C, the ambition gap takes us to the idea of a new legally binding instrument – a new Protocol under the Convention - to complement the KP.

3.         A Durban Mandate for a New Protocol

The EU, now supported by many other countries, including members of the Umbrella Group and Russia, is proposing the negotiation of a new, legally binding agreement with quantified emission reduction obligations for all major emitters. Since this is not yet part of the UNFCCC agenda, a new Mandate is needed to create a negotiation track for a new Protocol under the Convention. The EU wants this work to start immediately and be concluded by 2015. While the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) would be the foundation for the new deal, it would have to be interpreted with current economic realities in mind (read: BASIC countries would have to make significant mitigation commitments reflecting their current and future economic growth and carbon emissions.) Interestingly, the Europeans are open to India’s argument that per capita emissions should be an important indicator for a country’s share of responsibility for global emission cuts. This could be a strategic move to create divisions among China and India, who have very different domestic emission profiles.

Unsurprisingly, the US does not support the EU proposal (yet) and rejects any commitment to legal form before talking about substance (and of course, substance should not be discussed until 2020). Maybe Todd Stern will say a few more constructive things this week than Jonathan Pershing did last week.

4.         The Green Climate Fund (GCF)

Getting the GCF on the road (‘operationalizing’ this element of the Cancun Agreements) could become one of key achievements of Durban, and there is a good chance this will succeed. Two different types of concerns remain. The technical issues include full legal personality for the GCF, host country and board membership. Most contentious is the question of funding sources: The US is pushing for the inclusion of private money, while most developing countries prefer fully public sourcing of the GCF, e.g., with a hard commitment of 1.5% of GDP of developed countries and/or a Tobin tax.

 5.        A Bunch of Additional Contentious Items

A “comprehensive and balanced outcome at Durban,” as many delegates like to call it, requires a resolution of the following issues in addition to the big-ticket items outlined above:

·      Transparency – Translating current Copenhagen pledges into comparable, quantified emission reduction obligations (QELROS); creating a credible international accounting system for emission reductions, including reporting standards and a registry;

·      Review – AOSIS has raised this new issue, insisting that the overall goal of the Convention (2°C) should be the core subject of the review, which will take place between 2013 and 2015, and that a new body (rather than one of the existing subsidiary bodies of the Convention) should conduct the review.

·      Response Measures - Negative social and economic effects of (unilateral) measures, e.g., trade impacts of border-adjustment measures and the European plans to include aviation in the EU ETS, are a matter of great concern to developing countries and OPEC.

·      Market Mechanisms – There is a need to clarify their overall role in the climate regime, and the importance of introducing new ones (esp. in the context of becoming more ambitious).

·      Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights – Although these issues did not feature big in discussions last week, they are probably a fight waiting to happen this week.

In short, the Durban Deal would have to indicate transparent, and more ambitious mitigation paths between now and 2020, both within the KP, and by laying the foundations for a new legal instrument to be negotiated before 2015. This is a steep up-hill battle for the remaining four days. If the ministers can work it out, this could mean a significant shift of the debate away from a stark division between developed and developing countries towards a single burden-sharing agreement for all. While that sounds like something the US should welcome, there are good reasons to doubt American receptivity. Everyone – including the US delegation - has major concerns about the chances of getting any new climate agreement ratified by the US Congress. And what’s the point of signing a deal that will never be implemented by the world’s second largest emitter? This hard lesson learned from the Kyoto Protocol is a dark and heavy cloud hanging over the ICC in Durban.