Climate Mission Impossible

December 8, 2015

Does anybody else find the ongoing conversation about the temperature goal curious?

The growing number of supporters of a 1.5°C long-term temperature goal is bizarre. Simply stated, 1.5°C is impossible at this point in time. If you ask any serious climate modeler without shoving a microphone in their face, they will tell you that there is no longer a reasonable pathway to 1.5°C (on a time scale that is relevant for humanity). On record, the scientists squirm and say things like “an extremely slim chance,” (CICERO’s Glen Peters) or “technically feasible” (Andy Wiltshire at the UK Met Office). But what they mean is that there is simply no way you can bridge the gap between unrealistic, overly optimistic model assumptions (e.g., peaking this decade, 50% reductions over the next 15 years, massive negative carbon emissions) and the real constraints of decarbonization (including the anticipated growth of coal power in India and China).

Even the good old 2°C goal seems like quite a stretch at this point, unless “a little miracle” happens in 2030, as a colleague of mine put it yesterday. The current INDCs – if implemented fully – give us a decent chance (not certainty) to end up somewhere between 2.7°C and 3.5°C with an option of bending the curve to 2°C after 2030 with a fast phase-out of fossil fuels and even faster scaling up of negative emissions technologies (something our R&D budgets have been neglecting, btw.).

Nevertheless, the question whether or not to aim for 1.5°C has become one of the fundamental issues at COP 21 – a kind of litmus test for your moral worth: are you with the most vulnerable countries or not? Although I suspect I will make myself unpopular saying this, I believe that this is not only an unproductive framing of the necessary conversation about an appropriate goal for the Convention. It is also a dangerous path to set the climate regime on.

Here’s a very brief history of the temperature target:

• One of the few important results of Copenhagen was a political agreement that established 2°C as a long-term goal to keep the world safe from “dangerous” climate change in accordance with Art 2.1 of the Convention.
• AOSIS has always fought for 1.5°C, but acceded to the Copenhagen Accord as better than nothing. However, here in Paris, the AOSIS chair has called the lower temperature goal a “moral threshold”.
• In 2014, the LDCs started to campaign for 1.5°C. Saleemul Huq, Director of the International Centre for Climate and Development, offers a reason for this renewed focus on the temperature target: the difference between a 1.5°C and 2°C ‘is roughly 1.5 million people who will fall through the cracks and most of them will be in vulnerable and developing countries.’ The more ambitious target – even if not achieved – would make these climate impact victims visible. Some island states and African least developed countries now have a joint voice for 1.5°C in Climate Vulnerable Forum. 
• A part of the NGO community, including youth and climate justice organizations, are also in favor of the more ambitious goal, as CAN keep stating in their ECO newsletter.
• Galvanized by this momentum and media attention, Santa Lucia reintroduced 1.5°C into the negotiation text last week (thank you, New York Times, for a very well-timed piece on the disappearance of the Marshall Islands).
• Saudi Arabia is resisting any mention of the temperature target, or even the summary report of 2013-2015 review process. This report made some critical observations about the expected climate impacts of 2°C warming, raising the question whether that would actually prevent ‘dangerous’ climate change.
• In a meeting last week Wednesday, when parties discussed requesting the IPCC to draft a special report on the impacts of 1.5°C warming, India had the guts to spell out what other (mainly developed) countries are probably only thinking: regardless of achievability, it might simply be too expensive to aim for 1.5°C.
• Regardless of the pessimism sown by Saudi Arabia and India, COP 21 president Francois Hollande made a pitch for 1.5°C “if possible.” Germany’s lead negotiator followed suit - a bit awkward, given that Germany’s pavilion is all about 2°C. Flasbarth’s differentiation between making 1.5°C the long-term goal and finding some way to insert the number into the language of the Paris agreement turns out to be an important one.

Photo Credit: Getty Images

• Over the weekend, something must have happened. On Monday the statements of support for 1.5°C kept rolling in one after the other, making the story weirder by the hour:
• The EU said it was “open” to a 1.5°C target.
• Canada’s Environment and Climate Minister McKenna announced on Sunday that she supports 1.5°C – a stunning turn-around of the Canadian government, reflecting the shift from the Harper era to Trudeau’s liberal government. She buffered that statement a day later, saying Canada supports language on 1.5°C rather than making it the single long-term goal under the new agreement.
• The US’s Todd Stern said “We are working with other countries on some formulation that would include 1.5°C,” – again, some formulation, not the ultimate goal. Secretary of State, John Kerry, shed some more light on this position when he said “I think we should embrace it as a legitimate aspiration, … [b]ut I don’t think we can make it the embraced targetable goal because we lose people when we head that way.” Alright, so we are sympathetic to the idea but we won’t actually aim for it?
• China followed suit with an - as always - interpretable statement on supporting developing countries.
• India was a bit wobbly on the issue, having voiced its doubts about the affordability of 1.5°C last week, but seems to be coming around too. “Why not 1°C, why 1.5°C,” asked Ashok Lavasa, India’s lead negotiator. Yesterday Susheel Kuman commented that India had no problem with 1.5°C target if the required emission cuts were made by the developed countries (while India’s growing GHG emission increasingly cancel out those cuts).
• Finally, in a move that still boggles my mind, a group of business leaders issued a statement in support of 1.5°C.

So, what is going on? What is this collective denial of science all about? Is there a rational reason for this newly found support for the most vulnerable? Are moral emotions taking over in the face of heartbreaking realities? Let’s see if political and cognitive science can shed some light on this puzzle.

Reason & Rationality

International relations theory would suggest that states act in their national interest, understood as a rational assessment of costs and benefits. That neatly seems to explain the position of small island states and maybe some LDCs, who face existential threats (the actual threat of death or disappearance) to their statehood (because of the loss of their territory), their nationhood (in case their people disperse and change) and their culture. Given the higher chance of preserving these ultimate goods in a 1.5°C warming scenario, it is absolutely in the interest of AOSIS to insist on this goal. Cognitive science tells us that islanders’ minds work hard to reject the impossibility-argument, clinging to the remaining slivers of hope and an ‘overshoot and return’ option as long as there is territory left to defend from climate death. You might argue with Slate’s Eric Holthaus that they might be better off negotiating for real money (loss and damage) rather than unreal warming goals. But in extreme cases like this, human beings do not trade-off sacred values for money. The mind uses what is called deontological reasoning when it comes to matters of survival – a principled (and highly emotional) question of right or wrong rather than (im)possibility or (un)affordability. And even if they eventually acknowledge that 1.5°C is unachievable, the formal goal enshrined in the Paris Agreement would give them a much stronger argument to claim financial support for their action.

A rational explanation for the LDCs is a little different, but also not that hard. Pursuing 1.5°C makes a lot of tactical and strategic sense in the negotiations. A more ambitious temperature target would strengthen their claim for finance, technology transfer and capacity building support – more ambition requires more action; more action requires more support. And even if 1.5°C turns out to be unachievable, having the goal formally established in the Paris Agreement would lay the foundations for strong Loss and Damage claims once the world passes this temperature threshold. Like CBDR in the Convention, this reference would be here to stay and certainly do a lot of work for the developing world in the years and decades to come.

Alright, we’ve got AOSIS and the LDCs covered. But what about those not in danger of losing statehood, homeland, culture, livelihoods and lives? Pursuing an impossible goal is hardly in their national interest. Or is it?

Maybe they are taking the science really seriously, and have come to a new understanding of their national interest in the light of climate tipping points. Two tipping points (coral bleaching and Greenland melting) are becoming more likely when the global temperature passes 1.5°C. Maybe the major emitters want to reduce mitigation (and adaptation costs, because mitigating earlier and faster (the necessary conditions for a 1.5°C scenario) is cheaper than postponing action. Or they realize that sea-level rise is not just a problem for small island states. However, nothing in their statements or behavior so far points to this explanation.

Norms, Justice and Emotion?

But rationality and risk assessment might not be all that matters. Some theories of international relations tell us that ideas and norms – especially norms of justice – matter. The moral norms invoked by small island states are not backed up by economic power, yet, they have a funny way of taking hold of people and processes. In addition, cognitive science suggests that all ideas – especially norms of justice – are accompanied by a set of powerful emotions, that can motivate our actions.

So maybe, it’s not just the vulnerable, who make emotional demands for justice, but the powerful who cannot deny the moral power of those who stand to loose everything? Maybe high emitters find it hard to admit to the victims of their (growing) prosperity that they have messed up. Taking responsibility for somebody else’s ultimate loss might simply be impossible, especially when trivial benefits in one part of the world have catastrophic costs in another. Wrong doesn’t begin to cover it.

Don’t do it.

Regardless of the reasons, formalizing the impossible in an international treaty is not a good idea. You might argue that it can’t do any harm to aim high and fall a little short – better than aiming low and getting there. But there are serious drawbacks to establishing a Climate Mission Impossible, even if it’s just a façade with the purpose to comfort those whose loss will be immeasurable. For one, the psychology of goal achievement tells us that setting unrealistic (rather than ambitious) goals usually leads to resignation – you don’t even try to achieve the impossible. Second, the UNFCCC would lose credibility when real temperature records show that it has engaged in wishful thinking. Third, the parties would lay the foundations for a set of future contestations over the responsibility for failing to achieve a shared goal, and linked to that loss, damage and the much-dreaded idea of compensation. Fourth, they are missing out on an opportunity to establish a more sensible goal to begin with, one that could be measured while we are working on it (e.g., GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, or decarbonization of economies and societies.) rather than with a lag time inherent in the climate system.

Reading the Subtle Signs of Doha – A Cognitive Lens on Climate Diplomacy

   

Much has been written about the latest round of global climate negotiations at COP 18 in Doha. Much of the blogosphere has expressed its disappointment with the Doha Gateway, complained about the weakness of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, worried about the slow speed of the ADP and wondered about the potential of the new kid on the block – Loss and Damage. Here I would like to draw attention to some developments that many political analysts might dismiss as the usual but unimportant drama on the sidelines. First, AOSIS chair Sai Novoti made demands labeled as non-strategic when he asked for a five-year second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, called for firm climate funding pledges, and requested higher emission targets for the EU. Second, the lead negotiator of the Philippines Naderev Sano broke down on the plenary floor in an undiplomatic expression of emotion and appealed to his colleagues not as a diplomat but as a human being to take urgent action on climate change.

These incidents have one thing in common: they break the unwritten rules of the diplomatic game. They are interventions of passionate and feeling human beings rather than well-functioning and polite diplomats who quietly work the system to find compromise. Most importantly, these first cracks in the diplomatic façade of the UNFCCC mark the beginning of something new, and I believe that they are likely to grow wider and more numerous in the years to come. Beyond carrying significant implications for future negotiation dynamics, the increasing willingness of negotiators to step outside the current boundaries of climate diplomacy is a reflection of the state of the planet – intensifying climate change impacts are changing life experiences and political thinking today.

Before trying to explain Novoti’s and Sano’s unexpected behavior with the help of a little bit of cognitive science, international relations theory and ethics, let me summarize why these gentlemen’s behavior raised some eyebrows.

Novoti’s “aggressive demands” were seen as non-strategic because they were unlikely to be fulfilled and risked breaking the new alliance between the EU and AOSIS. AOSIS was believed to have no bargaining leverage for these demands and remaining isolated would waste its moral high ground. Further, the “radical” stance was open to exploitation by players who sought to stall the negotiations. Hence, making such demands was not rational.

Sano’s breakdown was a reaction to the tragedy that typhoon Bopha had left in its tracks across the Philippines a day before. It was an unusual demonstration of vulnerability and emotional suffering experienced by an individual on behalf of his countrymen. Even more unusual than his tears in a formal negotiation setting was Sano’s appeal to his fellow negotiators to act not in their national interest, but for the benefit of all human beings on the planet: 

“The outcome of our work is not about what our political masters want. It is about what is demanded of us by 7 billion people.”   

To some extent both Novoti and Sano temporarily disregarded the behavioral conventions of multilateral negotiations. One asked for things outside the currently available room for compromise; the other questioned the most basic rule in international relations: states protect their national interests. Neither individual human beings nor humanity as a whole play any role in this system of states – they have no representatives, no rights and no obligations.

Cognitive science and ethical theory offer an interesting explanation for these observations. The hypothesis is simple: Because island state representatives like Novoti and Sano think and feel differently in response to climate change information than other climate negotiators, they are occasionally compelled to act differently too.

The key difference between the thoughts and feelings of island negotiators and other diplomats in the UNFCCC lies in the type and timing of climate-related harm individuals anticipate. First, it matters whether individuals expect costs for themselves or for others. Second, a distinction between present and future risks has implications for someone’s sense of urgency. The third dimension along which beliefs of negotiators differ is the quality or type of the harm they expect from climate change. Fundamentally different ways of ethical reasoning are associated with different types of expected harm.  

Representatives of low-lying island states perceive climate impacts as an existential threat to themselves – literally threatening the existence of their home state due to sea-level rise, the existence and identity of coastal communities or entire cultures, and the survival of large numbers of people due to extreme weather events. Climate impacts are an immediate threat in the sense that they can happen any day as Bopha painfully demonstrated. This threat perception evokes strong emotions of dread and fear and triggers what is called deontological reasoning: ethical frameworks that use a certain normative standard of right and wrong. Collective climate action becomes simply the right thing to do for the international community because it can prevent major harm to some of the deepest human values: survival, identity and a home.

In contrast to such emotionally intense ‘hot’ threat perceptions of island state representatives negotiators from less vulnerable states have far less emotive, ‘cooler’ cognitive patterns. They often perceive climate change as something distant, expecting climate impacts to affect economic development at some point in the future rather than today, and in other countries than their own. Instead of being deeply concerned about climate change impacts they are worried about the costs that a response to climate change could impose on their countries – climate action poses an immediate threat to their own economic and material wellbeing. Some cognitive science suggests that this type of material risk assessment is associated with consequentialist thinking – a concern with the costs and benefits of different paths of action – which results in a rational reluctance to act today. This type of thinking is dominant in the UNFCCC process and fits the expectations of many scholars of international relations who use a rational choice framework to understand the political dynamics.

Consequently there are at least two starkly different cognitive patterns that are clashing with each other in the climate negotiations. Some negotiators believe, and more importantly feel, that regardless of the costs involved everything needs to be done to prevent certain types of future climate-related harm, e.g., the disappearance of island states. Inaction is a fundamental moral failure of humanity. Others believe that only some actions are justified based on a rational assessment of costs and benefits, leaving open the possibility that some harm – including the loss of island states - might not be worth preventing. The former belief system focuses on humanity as a reference point for shared values and responsibilities; the latter remains locked in state-based thinking. 

So far the ‘hot’ thinkers have been in a powerless minority, frustrated by the general lack of urgency in the UNFCCC process. Novoti’s and Sano’s behavior can be interpreted as first signs of desperation after years of running into the walls of a system created for the protection of sovereignty and national interests. But what does this increasing level of desperation signal for the future of the negotiation process?

·      2012 marks the year when a first small group of actors is beginning to break under the weight of domestic climate change impacts, resulting in short glimpses of human vulnerability through the thinning armor of diplomatic formality. Climate change politics are no longer about “Saving tomorrow today” as COP 17 host South Africa framed it. Instead they are about fixing today what we did not prevent from happening yesterday. A fundamental shift in temporal thinking is necessary to recognize that climate change is a present and not a future problem.

·      Over time the negotiation process could become more erratic, because increasing intensity and geographic distribution of climate impacts will increase the number of negotiators willing to challenge and break the rules of a system they experience as unresponsive to their most fundamental concerns. The reality of climate change will start to wreck havoc with the politics, mediated by cognitive processes.

·      Although many people already experience the negotiations as contentious, frustrating and personally taxing, the process could become increasingly confrontational with a growing division of participants into at least two groups with very different beliefs and emotions, diminishing mutual understanding and possibly mutual respect over time.

·      Finally, these observations raise the question whether the international system, based on rules of sovereignty and national interest competition, is incapable of addressing climate change. Multilateralism in its current form might have hit is limits. Are there alternatives? Can and should we start to think about a system that can represent and protect the interests of humanity rather than that of states, industries, or other small but resource-rich interest groups?

Reading the signs early can help avert some of the most undesirable trends. Most importantly it can open an important time window to create awareness among the negotiation participants of the cognitive-emotional drivers of different negotiation behavior, and to open a discussion about the practical limits of conventional UN diplomacy in the face of an unconventional governance challenge.